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This paper reviews the urban redevelopment activities in Shanghai as the 
land market reforms were introduced.  We focus on the impact of land use 
institutions on the spatial pattern of these activities. Sites for private real 
estate redevelopment were supplied by individual districts in the city. But the 
need for districts to pay for the resettlement of displaced residents 
contributed to a spatial mismatch between the supply of redevelopment 
sites and the market demand for commercial real estate space. 
Resettlement costs are highest at the high demand locations.  State owned 
enterprises and institutions occupying land allocated by the state also 
engaged in real estate development. Whereas the density of private 
redevelopment was sensitive to the volume of commercial activities in a 
district, this does not appear to have been important in determining the 
location of the significant increase in the stock of commercial space 
resulting from development by local enterprises and institutions. This 
growth shows considerable decentralization between 1993 and 1996, 50  Fu, Somerville, Gu and Huang 
   










One of the striking features of the economic reform process in China is the co-
existence of public ownership and central planning with private property 
rights and free markets.  This cohabitation is as present in urban land markets 
as it is in other sectors of the Chinese economy.  In this paper we study urban 
redevelopment and the emergence of the land market in Shanghai to discover 
how the mixture of private and public property r ights has influenced the 
pattern of redevelopment activities in Shanghai.  
 
To study redevelopment we take advantage of the flood of construction 
activity in Shanghai that followed the land market reforms of the early 1990's.
1  
The reforms coincided with the end of forty years of socialist planning and 
the re-emergence of Shanghai as a business and financial service center. 
During the socialist period, there was virtually no commercial development.  
Consequently, at the start of the reform period, there was considerable pent 
up demand. The reform period ushered in the legalization of some private 
property rights, opened up the real estate market to foreign developers, and 
decentralized capital investment budgeting to local governments and state-
owned enterprises. This made it possible for local governments to lease land 
for private real estate development and for state-owned enterprises to 
exercise the option embedded in the state-allocated land use rights to 
redevelop their urban sites. In both cases, they could earn revenues from the 
location value of land under their control.  Supply responded to demand with 
such intensity that the shortage of commercial buildings in the city in early 
1990’s turned into a gross oversupply in just a few years. 
 
With a market allocation of land, different types of users obtain space based 
on their willingness to pay for access and neighborhood quality associated 
with a location.  In the classic urban economics monocentric city paradigm, 
                                                 
1 In interviews in 1996, municipal officials claimed that there were over 20,000 
development sites in Shanghai.  Around the same time the Mayor is quoted as saying that 
fully one quarter of the world’s construction cranes were at work in Shanghai.   Land Use Rights  51 
 
central locations are the most valuable  for those business activities that 
demand shared service inputs and for which face-to-face communication is 
particularly productivity enhancing.  Firms for which these factors are not as 
important locate further away from the center.
2  Most cities have a polycentric 
form, with the CBD as the largest center.  In the last two decades, the 
empirical literature has taken the monocentric analysis of Muth (1969) and 
Mills (1972) and applied it to polycentric urban forms.  This literature includes 
work identifying the presence and location of subcenters (Greene 1980, 
McDonald 1987, and Giuliano and Small 1991); analysis of the effects of 
subcenters on land values (Heikkila, et. al., 1989 and McMillen and 
McDonald, 1989); and estimates of the price, employment and population 
density gradients around subcenters (Sivitanidou 1996 and 1997, McMillen 
and McDonald 1997, and Small and Song 1996).  With the notable exception 
of McMillen’s work (1996) on historic land prices in Chicago, most studies of 
suburban employment nodes take their distribution as given.  This paper 
looks at a particular aspect of urban development, as we examine how the 
spatial pattern of development is affected by the institutional framework in 
which development occurs.
3  Even though we look at a short period of time, 
the volume of new development activity allows us to examine a dynamic 
process, rather than the static patterns of existing land use. 
 
The first empirical issue we study is the tradeoff between market demand for 
location and the spatial variation in the unique redevelopment costs that 
district governments face in supplying land.  Unlike a private landowner, the 
local governments who are negotiating the land lease sales with private 
developers must provide the households and firms displaced by 
redevelopment with replacement structures. These costs are not uniform 
across space.  The high residential and manufacturing density in the core 
urban area, a result of meager investment in urban infrastructure and housing 
under socialist planning, means that the resettlement costs for redevelopment 
in these areas can be much higher than in more distant districts. 
Consequently, the spatial variation in land supply by district governments 
may be quite different than if they behaved wholly as private landowners, 
who would not face these resettlement costs.  
 
The second question examines the role of private developers and local 
enterprises and institutions in changing the land use pattern in Shanghai.  
We show that, the high value of land for commercial use in central urban 
                                                 
2 The classic empirical study of the economics of firm location is the detailed analysis of 
business activity in New York by Hoover and Vernon (1959).   
3 Bertaud (1996) and Bertaud and Renaud (1997) examine the spatial pattern of urban 
land use in various cities under different economic institutions. 52  Fu, Somerville, Gu and Huang 
   
locations encouraged the conversion of lower-value residential and industrial 
uses at these locations to commercial use.  However, new construction of 
commercial floor space was less concentrated in central locations than what 
market demand for business locations would dictate. One question we explore 
is whether this decentralized redevelopment pattern is a result of 
redevelopment by state-owned enterprises and institutions of the sites they 
themselves occupy. These existing land users in the city have land use rights 
for their sites as part of the bundle of rights allocated to them by the state. 
They can redevelop their sites for their own uses but cannot trade their land 
use rights.  One effect of the inability to trade is that it reduces the 
opportunity cost of redeveloping their sites for their own use.  Moreover, the 
uncertainty surrounding the expiry of this redevelopment option and the 
ready supply of bank loans further distorted the opportunity cost of 
redevelopment.  As a result, land-rich state-owned enterprises and 
institutions had a strong incentive to redevelop their sites for more profitable 
commercial uses even prematurely or at less desirable locations than would 
be the case for an owner in a market economy. We are interested in whether 
these distorted incentives have affected the spatial pattern of redevelopment 
and changes in the stock of commercial real estate.  
 
To study the relationship between the land market and redevelopment in 
Shanghai we employ two sets of data.  The first is the sales of land lease by 
Shanghai’s ten urban districts for private real estate development between 
1992 and 1994.  The second is the aggregate data on the actual change in 
building floor area by various types of land use in individual districts 
between 1993 and 1996.
4 For a subset of the observations in the first data set 
we also know their location within each district.  This allows us to obtain a 
clearer picture of the spatial patterns of redevelopment and to estimate a price 
surface of land values in the city.  By comparing total changes in the quantity 
of space with the space developed by private developers on land leased from 
local governments we can infer the volume and location of redevelopment by 
enterprises and institutions that have state allocated land use rights.  
 
The structure of the paper is as follows. In the next section, we provide a 
background on Shanghai’s development history, land market institutions, and 
market conditions at the time of the reforms in the urban land market. The 
historical background would be useful for understanding the demand for, as 
well as the constraints on, urban redevelopment in Shanghai. Next, we 
                                                 
4 The Shanghai municipal government administers 10 urban districts, 4 suburban districts 
(the fourth, Pu Dong, was created in 1993 out of parts of the three of the urban districts 
and a suburban county), and six rural counties.  Two thirds of the urban population live in 
the 10 districts, and over 70 percent of non-residential real estate are in these areas.    Land Use Rights  53 
 
present the spatial model of land value in Shanghai, utilizing non-parametric 
techniques to estimate a land price surface for the city.  We then analyze the 
spatial pattern of land lease projects and of the change in land use, providing 
evidence regarding the two research questions identified above. Finally, in 
our concluding section, we discuss the implications of our results and 





Historic Patterns of Land Use in Shanghai   
 
The liberalization of Shanghai's urban land market occurred in a built-up 
environment that reflected both pre-revolution economic activities and 
China's communist planned industrialization policies.  Prior to 1948 
commercial activity was concentrated in the Huang Pu district, the former 
British Concession.  Two main parallel retail corridors extended away from the 
Huang Pu River: Nanjing Road in the     British Concession and Huihai Road 
(the Avenue Joffre) to the South in the French concession. Even at the 
beginning of the 1990’s, Huang Pu accounted for almost a quarter of all office 
building space in the city and the highest density of shopping space among 
the districts, with four times as much shopping space per resident as the 
average for the other nine urban districts.  Nearly all of the principal 
commercial structures dating from Shanghai's tenure as China's business 
center remain in place, though the space is now occupied by the offices for 
government ministries and enterprises, and some light industrial concerns.
5  
 
Under the planned economy, Shanghai’s commercial activities were neglected 
in favor of industrialization. Without much alternation of the existing stock, 
planners achieved a great increase in the industrial employment by 
converting commercial sites to light industrial use.  The service sector share 
of GDP in the city declined from 44 percent in 1953 to 18.6 percent in 1978, as 
the industrial share increased from 42.6 percent to 77.4 percent.
6  As a result, 
by the beginning of the reform period industry accounted for 26.7 percent of 
land use in the ten urban districts.  In comparison industrial land uses occupy 
6 percent of land in Hong Kong and 9 percent in Seoul.  Mixed land use 
between residential and manufacturing was the dominant form of land use 
prior to the reforms of the 1990's (Sit 1985).  The legacy of this period is an 
                                                 
5 In his introduction to the reprinted edition of a 1934 book, All About Shanghai, 
Lethbridge (1983) describes how easy it is to find the reference points of Old Shanghai 
under the veneer of the current users.  
6 Figures are from the Statistical Yearbook of Shanghai 1997. 54  Fu, Somerville, Gu and Huang 
   
absence of new space for commercial use, and a surplus of inappropriate 
uses, such as warehousing and manufacturing in commercial areas.   
 
Shanghai’s growth lagged behind other coastal areas in China during the 
early years of reform.  In the 1980's, Shanghai’s real GDP grew at an annual 
rate of 7.4 percent, trailing the national average of 9.3 percent. Only with the 
de facto government sanction that an economic renaissance in Shanghai was 
acceptable to Beijing, when Deng Xiaoping designated Shanghai as the 
‘dragon head’ of the Yangtze River, did economic growth i n the city 
accelerate.  Between 1991 and 1995 the city’s real GDP grew at an annual rate 
of over 14 percent. Accompanying this growth is a structural transformation 
as Shanghai reclaims its pre-revolutionary role as China’s premier financial 
and commercial center.  The service sector’s share of Shanghai’s GDP rose 
from 21.1 percent in 1980 to 40.1 percent in 1995; in some of the urban 
districts, the service sector GDP accounted for over 80 percent of GDP.  The 
existing stock of real estate was grossly inadequate to meet demand 
generated by both the high rates of economic growth and the re-emergence of 
the service sector.    
 
The historic legacy is evident in the pattern of land use and real estate space 
across districts.  In Figure 1 we show 1993 commercial (sum of office, retail, 
and hotel revenues) and industrial sales per capita by district.  The CBD 
district of Huang Pu has substantially more commercial activity than other 
districts.  Thanks to large investments in the 1980's in suburban heavy 
industrial  facilities such as Baoshan Steel and the Volkswagen factory, 
industrial land use is much more significant in the suburban districts, which 
show up in notably higher industrial sales per resident in these districts.  
Table 1 describes the distribution of floor space among land uses by district 
for 1993.  All activities are evident across the city. Commercial space makes 
up a substantially greater share of total floor space in Huang Pu and its share 
of total floor area is highest in the three core districts of Huang Pu, Lu Wan, 
and Jing An.  Outside of Huang Pu, industrial uses accounted for a major 
share of non-residential floor area.  With the exception of Pu Dong, industrial 
real estate tends to have a greater share of all floor space in the suburban 
districts; but it still makes up well over 25 percent of the non-residential real 
estate stock in the urban districts.    Land Use Rights  55 
 
Figure 1 :  Sales per Capita 
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Table 1: District size and composition of building floor area, 1993 













Residential Industrial Commercial 
Huang Pu  4.5  70,308  6,110  47.1%  8.5%  34.9% 
Nan Shi  7.9  63,533  7,180  64.1%  19.8%  5.0% 
Jing An  7.6  57,303  9,470  53.7%  22.0%  14.3% 
Lu Wan  8.1  52,217  8,460  54.1%  24.2%  11.5% 
Hong Kou  23.5  35,682  17,710  56.0%  26.0%  8.1% 
Zha Bei  28.5  23,659  15,020  53.2%  32.5%  4.7% 
Yang Pu  52.1  19,963  26,570  45.1%  40.4%  3.2% 
Chang Ning  38.3  15,707  15,070  54.5%  23.8%  9.6% 
Pu Tuo  54.8  14,752  17,770  54.1%  29.7%  6.4% 
Xu Hui  54.8  14,008  22,010  54.3%  23.8%  7.0% 
Pu Dong  522.8  2,749  23,750  63.1%  24.9%  4.7% 
Bao Shan  424.6  1,519  15,260  41.9%  45.0%  5.0% 
Ming Hang  370.8  1,383  10,270  42.8%  43.2%  5.1% 
Jia Ding  458.8  1,043  7,660  39.3%  35.6%  11.5% 
Urban Districts  280.1  22,874  145,370  52.9%  27.8%  8.2% 
Suburban Districts 1,776.9  1,730  56,940  50.6%  35.1%  5.8% 
Total  2,057.0  4,609  202,310  52.2%  29.8%  7.5% 
Sources: Statistical Yearbook of Shanghai 1994. 
 
Over forty years without investment in commercial structures left Shanghai 
with a stock of commercial space ill-suited for the changes wrought by 
economic liberalization.  The total supply of high quality rental office space in 
1993 was a mere 354,000 square meters.  With surging demand, rents and 
asset prices skyrocketed and vacancy rates plummeted.  Between 1990 and 
1993 the office rental index rose by 158 percent, hotel rates rose by 243 
percent as many enterprises began leasing hotel rooms for use as offices. 
Typical lease rates for the rare buildings with grade ‘A’ office space achieved 
annual lease rates of over $900 per sq. meter. Vacancy rates for grade A rental 
office buildings declined to 0.3 percent in 1994. In response, construction 
activity skyrocketed. Total real estate investment rose from about 0.8 billion 
yuan in 1990 and 1991 to 46.6 billion in 1995. Table 2 lists some of the real 
estate market conditions in Shanghai between 1990 and 1996. 
 
Shanghai's growth and potential sparked tremendous interest by foreign 
developers.  Between 1992 and 1993, slightly over 200 sites in the ten urban 
districts with a land area of approximately 2,100,000 m
2 were leased for 
commercial and residential development with foreign developers and Land Use Rights  57 
 
investors as the target market.  In 1994 another 1,000,000 m
2 of land was 
leased in these districts to these developers.  In addition to these land leases, 
large areas were designated as development zones, principally in the new 
district of Pu Dong.  
 
Table 2: Real estate market conditions in Shanghai 









1990  0.8     31.0        148 
1991  0.8     29.0        174 
1992  1.3     1.8     264 
1993  2.2     1.4     383 
1994  11.7     0.3     449 
1995  46.6     5.0        497 
1996  65.8     4.3
*     394 
Sources: Statistical Yearbook of Shanghai 1997 and Shanghai Real Estate Market 1997. 
  * The vacancy rate was about 20% according to Asia Pacific Property Digest (Jones 
Lang Wootton). 
 
The Institutional Framework for Real Estate Development in Shanghai 
 
Major reforms in urban land allocation began in the 1980’s. The legal 
framework for the registration and transfer of private land use rights was 
developed in the years following the 1988 amendment to China’s constitution. 
It was finally consolidated in the State Council’s 1990 Provisional Regulations 
on the Granting and Transferring of Land Use Rights for State-owned Land in 
Cities and Towns.
7  A critical step in these legal reforms was the separation of 
the right to use land from the ownership of the land.  This separation has 
allowed the state to continue to own the land (means of production), while 
creating a tradable claim on land, the ‘use right’.   
 
The authority to sell land leases and determine the terms of redevelopment 
rests with the land administration bureau of the local governments.  Typically, 
this is a city or county government, but in a large city like Shanghai, this 
authority was delegated to individual sub-municipal level district 
governments.  These district governments negotiate with developers on the 
terms of the sale and allowed density of development on a site.
8  Since 1993, 
                                                 
7 See Liu (1995, in Chinese) for a comprehensive review of the development of land 
market institutions between 1980 and 1990.  
8 The contract specifies the land use rights and term of the lease. The standard for these 58  Fu, Somerville, Gu and Huang 
   
all real estate developments for commercial or commodity housing uses are 
required to obtain a land lease. For any land lease transaction, individual 
districts remit up to 15 percent of the lease p remium to the municipal 
government and retain the remainder of the funds.  The primary purpose of 
these retained revenues is to finance the resettlement of residents and 
enterprises displaced by the redevelopment.   
 
One reason for the decentralization of land lease negotiating authority to the 
district governments is that they have the responsibility to resettle residents 
and enterprises displaced by redevelopment.
9  Households must receive 
adequate replacement quarters.  The policy is used as a vehicle to raise more 
households above the minimum government standards for unit quality and 
size.  Given the density of Chinese cities, redevelopment can result in very 
large resettlement costs for local governments. In Shanghai, government 
officials report that between 60 and 70 percent of the district land lease 
revenues finance resettlement. To clear every hectare of land, 800 to 1,000 
residents have to be relocated at a cost of 50,000 to 60,000 yuan per head 
(over $US 5,000). The magnitude of resettlement efforts has been tremendous. 
Between 1991 and 1994 about 8 million m
2 of buildings were demolished and 
200,000 households were resettled.
10   Early efforts relied on in-site 
resettlement of displaced occupants resulting in distortions in 
redevelopment; now off-site resettlement is the norm.
11  
 
The combination of fiscal autonomy and control over land leases by the 
individual districts created the incentives and opportunities for them to 
attract outside investment capital by promoting land leases and real estate 
developments in their jurisdiction.
12   Real estate development benefits 
                                                                                                         
leases has been 70 years for residential land uses and 50 years for nonresidential uses. 
Land prices and the maximum permitted floor-to-area ratio for the intended 
development are supposed to follow guidelines from municipal planning departments, but 
the negotiating district land administration bureaus appear to have significant freedom in 
these negotiations. 
9 Districts would prefer to resettle residents on land for which they have the land use 
right.  Districts lacking sufficient vacant land will enter into contracts with districts who 
have land, paying them to resettle residents.  
10 Figures are from Shanghai Economy Yearbook. 
11 See Dowall (1994) and World Bank (1993) for an analysis of resettlement.  
12 Before 1980, the districts’ budget accounted for less than 7 percent of the total fiscal 
budget of the city. By 1995, the districts and counties controlled 53.7 percent of fiscal 
revenue and expenditure in the city. Their revenues come from the enterprises under 
their jurisdiction and a variety of tax revenues that the districts share with the municipal 
government, including personal income tax, real estate tax, business tax, and the capital 
gain tax on land.  Land Use Rights  59 
 
individual districts in several ways. First, there are the revenues they collect 
directly from land use sales.  After remitting funds to the municipal 
government and paying for resettlement, a district might be left with 10-25 
percent of the lease revenues.  Second, the district governments frequently 
participate in the land lease projects through their real estate development 
subsidiaries.  This allows them to extract funds from the redevelopment 
process, which unlike land lease revenues, do not have to be remitted to 
higher levels of government.  Third, the real estate developments attract new 
business activities and higher income residents to the district, which provides 
a variety of fiscal benefits and enhanced status to the district government.  
 
Many enterprises and institutions have been allocated land use rights by the 
state.  The reforms have embedded a redevelopment option in these use 
rights, where the enterprises and institutions could redevelop the land at a 
higher floor-to-area ratio and a higher quality to create more building space 
for commercial business use. However, the value of this option is quite 
different than it would be for the owner of a property in a market economy, 
where such a redevelopment option can be sold and has no expiry date.  One 
critical difference is that in China uncertainty about future state actions over 
the allocation of property rights means that this option has an unknown 
future expiration date.  Consequently, redevelopment decisions by 
enterprises and local institutions may be responding to signals in a fashion 
different from those of private developers, with implications for the volume, 
type, and location of redevelopment.   
 
Demand for Location: 1992-93 Distribution of Land Prices 
 
We look at the distribution of land prices in Shanghai to infer the pattern of 
demand for location. As late as the mid-1930's Shanghai had a very steep 
downward sloping price gradient, with land prices falling as one moved away 
from the Bund
13.  According to Tian (1995), in 1933 the site of the Cathay 
Hotel (the current Peace Hotel) commanded a market value of 360,000 ounce 
of silver per mu (0.165 acre). The market value of land one km to the west 
along the Nanjing Road at the site of the Sincere Department Store was 37 
percent less.  Two blocks west of the Bund and two blocks south of Nanjing 
Road the market value of a site was 56 percent less.  We use the 205 land 
lease transaction from 1992-93 to estimate the current spatial pattern of land 
prices. We know the locations of these transactions, so it is a matter of 
estimating the price surface from these points; see Figure 3A and 3B for the 
location of these land lease sites among the urban districts.  
 
                                                 
13 The waterfront at Huang Pu River in the former British concession. 60  Fu, Somerville, Gu and Huang 
   
To generate a price surface, we estimate the price of land as a non-parametric 
function of location.  Like McMillen (1996) we apply Cleveland and Devlin’s 
(1988) locally weighted regression methodology to estimate this function.  
Over the last half decade there has been a notable increase in the use of non-
parametric and semi-parametric estimation techniques for analyzing the 
pricing of land and real estate.  Papers by Meese and Wallace (1991), Coulson 
(1992), Pace (1995), and McMillen (1996) use different forms of these 
techniques to allow flexibility in the estimation of parameters in hedonic 
house and land price equations, density gradients, and other functions of 
interest. McMillen and McDonald (1997) use the Cleveland and Devlin 
procedure to identify sites of increased employment density. However, unlike 
these papers, we do not parametrize the function in any way.  Instead, we let 
the data to describe the variation in land prices over space, so that all 
variation in land prices is treated as a function of location. Since we do not 
want to identify the effects of local accessibility and neighborhood quality 
separately, only to examine how preferences for location vary spatially, there 
is no loss from the more parsimonious specification.  Visual inspection of the 
price surface r eveals the value placed on location within the ten urban 
districts.  
 
We generate an estimate of the land price at every point on a 20 km by 10 km 
grid map, where grid points are spaced 0.25 km apart.  The estimated price at 
any point on this grid is a distance weighted average of the land lease prices 
for the nearest 30% of the land lease sites, where distance is a straight line 
Euclidian measure.
14  Weights are determined as follows.  For a given location 
on the grid i, let ui be the distance to the jth most distant land lease site from 
i; cross-validation determines what percentage of the sample to use, thus 
determining as well the value j. Let xi,m be the distance to some closer site m, 
m£ j  (land lease sites further away than the  jth site have a  
weight of zero). The weight for observation m in estimating the land price at i 
is: 
i m , i
j
3 3
i m , i
3 3
i m , i
m , i u x where
) ) u x ( 1 (







Figures 2A and 2B show the price surface that results from our estimation.  
Shanghai is strongly monocentric, but the land price peak is not in the heart 
                                                 
14 There are a large number of potential kernal estimators that could be used in place of 
the tri-cubic function.  But as Hardle (1990) points out, most kernals yield qualitatively 
similar results.  More important is the choice of bandwidth.  Using cross-validation 
procedures we find that the best performance comes from using a bandwidth of the closest 
30 percent of the observations. See for a review of Yatchew (1998) non-parametric 
regression techniques.   Land Use Rights  61 
 
of the Huang Pu district, but further west and north centered around the  
 62  Fu, Somerville, Gu and Huang 
   
Figure 2A and 2B.  Surface Model of Land Prices using a 30% Band 
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border between Huang Pu and Jing An along Nanjing West Rd.  There also 
appears to be a sub-center in Chang Ning in the vicinity of the Hong Qiao 
development zone, near the inter-section of the ring and airport roads.   
Although the price gradient flattens in this area, a close up view in Figure 2C 
shows that there is a small peak.  Although there are other centers of 
development, the land prices and intensity of development at these locations 
are insufficient to exhibit a local price peak. The steepness of the price  
 
Figure 2C.  Land Prices around the Mini-Peak 
 64  Fu, Somerville, Gu and Huang 
   
gradient reinforces the view that the three core districts in Shanghai remain 
the center of commercial activity.  Our land lease data includes no 
transactions for Pu Dong.  It is likely that there prices may either rise slightly 
in the area of the new financial center, or fall away from the CBD more slowly 
than they do in other directions.  
 
The Spatial Pattern of Redevelopment 
 
Urban reconstruction in Shanghai began prior to the introduction of land 
market reforms.  Between 1980 and 1993, floor area for residential, industrial 
and commercial space all increased, with annual growth rates of 5.3, 3.1, and 
7.1 percent respectively.
15   With the main post-reform construction beginning 
in 1993, there was a sharp drop off in the growth of industrial space and an 
acceleration in the construction of residential and commercial space.  From 
1993 to 1996 the annual growth rates for floor space in these property types 
were 7.5, 0.4, and 10.9 percent respectively.  This post-reform change reflects 
the relative return on different types of space as well as the need to provide 
space for the rapidly growing service sector.  
 
The Location of Land Lease Projects 
 
We first examine the spatial distribution of the land lease sites in the urban 
districts for the period from 1992 to 1994. All land leases in these districts 
were for  residential, commercial, or multi-use development. The multi-use 
projects are a mix of office space with some combination of retail, hotel, and 
apartment space.  One might expect that given Shanghai’s transportation 
network, concentration of amenities in the core, and the historic absence of 
non-local serving commercial development outside of the CBD and retail 
districts, that commercial and mixed-use developments will be concentrated in 
the core.  Furthermore, since units in the residential projects development by 
foreign developers was originally targeted towards overseas investors and 
expatriates, we might expect them to be located near commercial districts.
16   
                                                 
15 The comparison with building stock figures prior to 1993 is problematic because over 
the period there were changes in the urban boundary.   
16 With the mammoth overbuilding in Shanghai, developers have begun to market their 
projects to local buyers too (South China Morning Post, December 16, 1998) Land Use Rights  65 
 
Figure 3A.  Location of Commercial and Mixed Use Projects 
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Figure 3B.  Location of Residential Projects 
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Redevelopment is not evenly spaced throughout the city.  Fully 25 percent of 
the sample is in the Chang Ning district.  Figures 3A and 3B show the 
locations of these sites for the commercial and mixed-use projects and the 
wholly residential  projects, respectively.  Residential projects are 
concentrated in a few relatively distant districts, with a particularly noticeable 
cluster of low-density villa projects in the Chang Ning district near the airport.  Land Use Rights  67 
 
Relative to residential projects, commercial and mixed-use projects are 
distributed more uniformly across districts.  They do have several areas of 
clustering: in the shopping district along Nanjing West Road at the border of 
Jing An and Huang Pu districts, in Zha Bei near the rail road station, in Xu 
Hui near the Xujiahui subway station, and in Chang Ning, between the airport 
and the ring road in the Hong Qiao development zone.  Table 3 lists the land 
lease volumes by district in descending order of 1993 population density. 
Columns 2 and 3 in t he table list the total area of land lease sites for 
commercial projects (multi-use and retail projects) and residential projects 
(apartments and villas) respectively.  
 
Table 3: Land lease activities in the urban districts (1992-1994) 
Districts  Total m
2 Land Leased  Average km to CBD (1992-93 only) 
  Multi-use  Residential  Multi-use  Retail  Apartments  Villas 
Huang Pu    214,095     0  1.3  1.2     
Nan Shi    107,520      1,590  2.7    3.6   
Jing An    242,608     21,742  4.3    4.4   
Lu Wan    219,391     17,138  3.0  4.3     
Hong Kou    123,476     75,284  2.1    3.0   
Zha Bei    145,924      0  3.3       
Yang Pu    178,121      0  5.4       
Chang Ning    162,748     882,554  7.9    8.9  11.2 
Pu Tuo    100,358     117,031  6.1    9.6  14.7 
Xu Hui    301,058     253,958  6.6  6.9  6.9    8.3 
             
Grand Total  1,795,300  1,369,297  4.5  4.8  7.5  11.6 
Source: Shanghai Land Administration and calculation by the authors. 
 
To shed light on the distribution of land lease sites for commercial 
development, Figure 4 presents the density of land lease sites in individual 
urban districts. Between 1992 and 1994, Huang Pu leased 4.7 square meters of 
commercial development site for every 100 square meters of land, by far the 
highest level among the urban districts. Jing An and Lu Wan, which include 
the prime retail areas along Nanjing West Road and Huihai Road, also had 
exceptionally high density of commercial development sites. One might expect 
commercial development sites to be more centralized relative to residential 
development sites, because of the greater importance of proximity to the CBD 
for business activities. This is indeed the case, as revealed by the last four 
columns in Table 3. In each district, multi-use projects locate relatively near 
the CBD than do residential projects.  Overall, multi-use projects have a mean 
distance of 4.5 km to the CBD, compared to 7.5 km for apartment projects, and 68  Fu, Somerville, Gu and Huang 
   
11.6 km for villa developments.  The latter are the projects clustered at the 
most distant locations in Figure 3B. 
 
Figure 4.  Land Lease Area as a Percentage of Total District Area 
 Land Use Rights  69 
 
District Government Land Supply and Redevelopment 
 
Our first question is whether having land supplied by district governments 
instead of private landowners affects the distribution of redevelopment in 
Shanghai.  Given the institutional framework in Shanghai, we would expect 
that districts seek to maximize revenues net of resettlement costs.  
Consequently, they should supply more land in high demand, high land price 
areas, but less at locations where they will incur high resettlement costs.  We 
frame this question by stating the counterfactual, that land supply follows a 
dartboard model.  In this case, demand and resettlement costs are constant 
across locations, so that land lease sites will be randomly distributed across 
the city. An implication of this outcome is that a district’s share of land lease 
projects (in terms of land area leased) will be proportional to its share of land 
area.  With private landowners, those districts with more attractive locations 
will attract proportionally more land lease projects, but resettlement costs will 
have no effect on the supply of leased land.  However, in Shanghai the 
district government is the landowner and they also have to pay for 
resettlement, so that they should be more likely to supply land at locations 
with lower resettlement costs.  Our dependent variables in the first set of 
regressions are land lease intensity as measured by the land lease area as a 
percentage of total district area; we run separate regressions for residential 
and commercial or mixed-use projects.   
 
While we know the precise locations for land lease sites in 1992 and 1993, we 
only have district aggregates for 1994.  More restrictive is that our proxies for 
site attractiveness and resettlement costs are all district level aggregates.  
These district aggregate values are shown in Table 4.  As a result, with only 
ten true degrees of freedom the power of these tests is very low.  This makes 
it difficult to generate meaningful results, or even ones that are statistically 
different from zero.  This is a problem that plagues all of our empirical analysis 
that follows in this section.  In response, we interpret our results as 
suggestive of causation and reflective of underlying relationships, but in no 
way conclusive evidence.   
 
If local district governments behave like private landowners they will use 
demand as the sole criteria in determining how much land to lease and at what 
locations.  However, as we describe above, other issues affect their supply 
decision.  Here we seek to evaluate whether land supply and thus the pattern 
of redevelopment follows the pattern we would expect of private landowners, 
or whether resettlement costs that enter the government’s objective function 
alter the distribution of redevelopment.  To measure  
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Huang Pu  4.72  0.00  42,139  6,393  210,441  9.0  6,393 
Nan Shi  1.37  0.02  14,192  3,098  77,817  9.2  3,098 
Jing An  3.18  0.29  20,728  4,034  130,028  11.7  3,389 
Lu Wan  2.73  0.21  19,577  2,915  170,273  10.9  2,915 
Hong Kou  0.53  0.32  13,243  2,477  159,983  11.8  2,358 
Zha Bei  0.51  0.00  10,891  2,940  174,855  11.8  2,940 
Yang Pu  0.34  0.00  8,042  1,733  76,837  11.5  1,733 
Chang Ning  0.42  2.30  11,901  2,443  111,278  13.7  1,208 
Pu Tuo  0.18  0.21  10,165  2,580  111,543  11.9  1,752 
Xu Hui  0.55  0.46  9,013  1,819  110,267  15.6  1,328 
Sources: Statistical Yearbook of Shanghai,  Shanghai Economy Yearbook, and calculation 
by the authors. 
 
demand for or attractiveness of a site we use the 1994 commercial sales per 
resident for each individual district. If all commercial activity is local serving, 
there will be no unique employment nodes, and this figure will be constant 
across districts.  Districts with high commercial sales per resident are 
commercial centers that serve an area greater than the local area.  Land supply 
by private landowners could be expected to follow this demand.   To measure 
the resettlement costs from redevelopment of land lease sites facing a district 
we use the population density of residential land use. The results of the 
regressions are shown in Table 5.  
 
The extent of commercial and mixed-use development is strongly correlated 
with the attractiveness of a district for commercial business activities.  
Whether we measure this demand by commercial sales per capita or mean 
land price, these very simple regressions (column 1 and 2 in Table 5) suggest 
that districts are responding to demand and making more land available for 
non-residential land lease activities in those districts where demand appears 
strongest.  However, where resettlement costs are likely to be higher, the 
supply of land lease sites is lower (column 1). This last result is not 
statistically different than zero. Still it is indicative that resettlement costs can 
affect the pattern of development. 
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Table 5:OLS estimates of the determinants of district land lease activity 
Dependent variable  Commercial & multi-
use lease sites as % of 
district area 
Residential lease sites as 
% of district area 
  1  2  3  4 
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Dummy for Chang Ning 
District 






         
Unadjusted R
2  0.94  0.77  0.98  0.99 
Notes: The observations are the 10 urban districts.  T-statistics are in parentheses.   
*** Statistically significant at 1% level;  
** statistically significant at 5% level;  
* statistically significant at 10% level. 
 
The results for residential development shown in columns 3 and 4 in Table 5 
are not as strong.  We would expect that the development of residential units 
for foreign investors and business expatriates would be near business centers 
and indeed the volume of residential land supplied to developers is positively 
affected by the extent of commercial activity, but the t-statistics are smaller 
than they were for non-residential development.  We add another measure of 
site attractiveness, per-capita residential floor area.  Our prior is that districts 
with larger residential units are more pleasant locations.  Again intensity of 
residential land leases is higher in districts where residential space per capita 
is higher.  However, residential projects have to compete with commercial real 
estate projects for land. If demand to develop a site for a non-residential 
purpose is high, then average land prices at the location will be higher.  
Holding constant the attractiveness of the district for residential projects, 
supply of residential sites should be lower if the average land price for non-
residential developments is higher.  We find this too holds, but the 72  Fu, Somerville, Gu and Huang 
   
relationship is again not statistically different from zero by conventional 
standards.  The primary difference between residential and non-residential 
development is that residential development is unaffected by potential 
resettlement costs.  The most likely explanation for this is that residential 
projects are overwhelmingly concentrated in those districts with lower 
population densities and more residential floor area per capita.   
 
Dynamic Structure of Redevelopment 
 
Our second area of inquiry is the role of Shanghai’s institutional framework in 
determining the distribution of redevelopment across space.  There are two 
aspects to this question.  The first is whether the need to resettle residents 
affected the evolution in the pattern of redevelopment.  From above, we know 
that the percentage of a district’s area leased to foreign developers is lower 
when the expected resettlement costs are higher.  Here we ask whether there 
has been any change over time in net space added because of resettlement 
requirements.  The second is whether the spatial pattern of redevelopment by 
those local enterprises and institutions who had the redevelopment option as 
part of their state-allocated land use right differs from that of profit-maximizing 
developers.  
 
The absence of a functioning market for residential housing has forced 
district governments to provide housing for those residents displaced by 
redevelopment.  As Dowall (1994) demonstrates, the initial plan to provide in-
site resettlement was uneconomic, so that district governments had to 
construct or contract for resettlement housing at other locations.  While the 
governments of large districts away from the core, such as Chang Ning and 
Xu Hui, have ample land for resettlement, this is not true for the core districts 
like Huang Pu, Jing An, Lu Wan, and Nan Shi.  Resettlement is particularly 
important because as indicated in Table 4, these four core districts have the 
highest population density among all the urban districts.  The need to 
contract with other districts for land raises the cost of resettlement for these 
districts.  However, this condition has improved over time as redevelopment 
in less central districts and in particular in suburban districts like Min Hang 
has created a stock of housing for resettling displaced residents.   
 
With land market reforms and resettlement there has been a marked and rapid 
decentralization of Shanghai’s population. Between 1993 and 1996, total 
population in the urban area increased but that in 10 urban districts 
decreased.  The share of Shanghai's population in the  10 urban districts 
dropped from 68 percent in 1993 to 66 percent in 1996.  Much of this transfer 
of population is related to the resettlement of residents from sites in the core 
slated for redevelopment.  While the 4 suburban districts had 32 percent of Land Use Rights  73 
 
Shanghai’s non-rural population in 1993, fully 53 percent of the net increase 
in residential space between 1993 and 1996 occurred in these districts.  
 
The large increase in space in the suburbs has meant that urban district 
governments could now resettle residents without using the high value land 
in their own districts. Consequently, we would expect land lease activities in 
more central districts, particularly the land leases for commercial and multi-use 
development sites, to grow faster as their relative c ost of resettlement 
diminished over time. We use the share of the total floor area of 
redevelopment projects in the four core districts (Huang Pu, Jing An, Lu 
Wan, and Nan Shi) to measure the spatial concentration of redevelopment 
activities in the land market. For commercial and mixed-use space their share 
of the annual total has risen from 27 percent in 1992 to 35 percent in 1993 to 73 
percent in 1994. Their 1993 and 1994 share of the cumulative totals are 30 and 
46 percent respectively. This pattern does not hold for residential projects, 
but the majority of these projects are in the larger, less densely populated 
districts of Chang Ning and Xu Hui.  
 
Most redevelopment to date in Shanghai has been by enterprises and 
institutions who hold non-transferable land use rights on the sites they 
occupy.  Their land use rights are allocated by the state, and thus obtained 
without cost to the enterprise. Along with the use right is an option to 
redevelop the site. These enterprises and institutions may even find way to 
lease out the new space in excess of their own needs. Initially, enterprises 
could keep all redevelopment profits, but since 1995 they are legally obligated 
to share any redevelopment gain with the municipal government. Given the 
easy availability of bank loans in the early 1990's and the uncertainty over the 
expiration date of the redevelopment option, it is not surprising that many of 
there entities decided to redevelop immediately their sites. This raises the 
question whether this bundle of non-market rights and input prices distorted 
the growth in the urban form. It can cause the distortion in at least two ways. 
First, by encouraging redevelopment well before the optimal private market 
date. And second, by discouraging the business activities undertaken by 
land-rich state enterprises and institutions from being located close to the 
central business district.
17 To analyze this proposition we compare the spatial 
pattern of commercial space supply from land lease projects with that of 
changes in the stock of commercial real estate. This is an imperfect 
comparison at best. Changes in the stock of commercial real estate reflects 
those completed development projects started by local enterprises and 
institutions, any completed land lease projects, and any demolition of existing 
                                                 
17 For instance, if all sites redeveloped immediately, this might have occurred several 
years too early in some core locations, but decades too early in more suburban locations.   74  Fu, Somerville, Gu and Huang 
   
structures. Unfortunately, we cannot separate these into individual effects.  
 
To answer this question we use a simple approach of comparing aggregate 
district level data on the stock of real estate. As Table 6 shows that growth in 
commercial space was decentralizing. The growth in commercial floor area in 
the four core districts was proportionally lower than in the 10 urban districts 
as a whole, resulting in a reduced share of commercial floor area for the core 
districts (from 39 percent in 1993 to 35 percent in 1996). Moreover, the per-
resident commercial floor area in the core districts declined from 151 percent 
of the value for all 10 urban districts in 1993 to 145 percent in 1996, so 
commercial space was decentralizing faster than was population. In contrast, 
land lease projects were much more centralized. The core-district share of 
floor area in commercial and multi-use land lease projects ranged from 27 
percent in 1992 to 73 percent in 1994.  However, their share of the net addition 
in commercial floor area between 1993 and 1996 was only 22 percent.  Simple 
regressions also indicate the difference between the overall change in the 
stock and floor completion from land lease projects.   
 
Table 6: Spatial distribution of commercial floor area 
Share of commercial floor area by four 
core districts (percent of 10-urban-district 
total) 
Per resident floor area: 
core relative to all urban 
districts 
1993 total  1996 total  Change in total  1993  1996 
39  35  22  1.51  1.45 
Sources: Calculation by the authors based on Statistical Yearbook of Shanghai, various 
years. 
 
Table 7 presents a set of very simple regressions describing the estimated 
addition of commercial floor area in land lease projects with the actual 1993-96 
change in the stock of commercial space. Regression (1) tests the covariance 
of the commercial floor area supplied from land lease projects during 1993-96 
period as a percent of each district’s land area.  The dependent variable in 
regression (2) is the change in actual commercial space 1993-96 as a percent 
of district land area. In each case, the explanatory variables include district 
values of log commercial sales per capita and log population density for 
residential land use. With such a small sample size, ten districts, most of the 
estimated coefficients are not statistically different from zero.  However, one 
clear result is that a district's supply of commercial space from land lease 
projects during the period is sensitive to the district’s volume of commercial 
activity, but that this does not hold true for the total change in the stock of 
commercial floor space. These figures do suggest that while private Land Use Rights  75 
 
developers are quite sensitive to demand, the net change in space, which 
includes development by enterprises and institutions with land use rights, 
does not reflect this sensitivity.   
 





Floor area completion in 
commercial & multi-use 
land lease projects 
# as % 
of district land area 
Net change in total stock 
of commercial floor area 
as % of district land area 
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2  0.74  0.66 
Notes:  he observations are the 10 urban districts.  T-statistics are in parentheses.   
# Based on maximum allowed floor area for land lease projects. We assume that 
70% of floor area in multi-use projects is for commercial use, that 100% of the 
space in projects on land leased in 1992 was completed by 1996, 50% for leases 
signed in 1993, and 0% for 1994 land leases.  
*** Statistically significant at 1% level;
   
** statistically significant at 5% level. 
 
While by no  means conclusive, the data suggest that the pattern of 
redevelopment by enterprises and institutions on the land they own is more 
decentralized than the actions of private developers who obtain land lease 
sites from the city.  As we indicate above, we cannot separate out the 
contributions to the stock by these different classes of development.  
However, we can infer that the primary explanation for the difference between 
the land lease data and the total stock data is the new construction by 
enterprises and institutions, since that is likely to be a more major category 
than removals. In this case the strong incentives the enterprises and 
institutions perceived to redevelop before the appropriate time did result in 
far more decentralization than we would have found in the private market.  
 
Conclusions and Future Research 
 
We have provided a cursory review of urban redevelopment activities in 
Shanghai during its transition to a land market, focusing on the impact of land 
use institutions on the spatial pattern of these activities. Our results suggest 76  Fu, Somerville, Gu and Huang 
   
that in Shanghai the blending of socialist and market institutions created a 
number of distortions in the land market.  In particular, the need for districts 
to pay for resettlement costs affected the volume of land lease, so that new 
development in some districts was below the level private landowners would 
have chosen.  In addition, changes in the supply of redevelopment sites over 
time appear to be reinforcing this observation.  Land lease activity in central 
districts only accelerated once housing was available in more distant urban 
and suburban districts.  Furthermore, the huge volume of commercial building 
redevelopment by enterprises and institutions appears to have been much 
more decentralized than the activities of private developers of land lease sites.   
 
The highly aggregate nature of much of our data severely limits our ability to 
analyze these phenomena. Nevertheless, the preliminary findings of this 
paper indicate the need for studying the institutional  features in order to 
understand the operations of a land  market.   Future research should be 
targeted towards a better understanding of redevelopment activity by 
enterprises and institutions.  It is pretty clear that these activities have made 
up the bulk of the overbuilding that has plagued Shanghai, with current 
estimates of office vacancy rates of over 30 percent
18. To understand just 
what triggered this process, a better understanding of these redevelopment 
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